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RESUMO 
O artigo apresenta um problema de escolha do regime de faxa de cambio numa 
estrufura geral de precificagdo de fftulos. O governo e considerado o principal agente 
ofimizador no modelo onde mudangas de regime podem ocorrer uma vez quo o gover- 
no pode exercer poder discricionario no administragdo do cambio. Estimativos empiricos 
para o Brasil sugerem quo mudangas de regime sdo determinadas pelo comporfamenfo 
dos salarios e da inflagdo. De uma forma geral, os resulfados sugerem quo os fundamen- 
fos fern um impacfo mais significante sobre a faxa de cambio no curfo prazo. Os efeifos 
das variaveis de demando agregada no processo de determinagdo da faxa de cambio 
so se manifesfam no longo prazo. 
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ABSTRACT 
The paper develops an exchange rate regime choice problem in a general asset-pricing 
set-up. The government has been considered the main optimising agent in the model 
whereby regime switches may occur because the government can exercise discretion in 
exchange rate management. Empirical estimates for the case of Brazil suggest that regime 
switches are determined by the behaviour of wages and inflation. Overall, the results 
suggest that price fundamentals have a more significant impact on the exchange rate in 
the short run. It is not until the long run that domestic expenditure variables play a part in 
exchange rate determination. 
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INTRODUTION 
The increase in exchange rate volatility and the co-existence of a wide range of 
exchange rate regimes prompted by the collapse of Bretton Woods after 1973 
have given rise to a vast literature on exchange rate determination and regime 
choice in both developed and developing countries. Studies of optimal exchange 
rate regime choice have attempted to classify countries according to their 
exchange rate regime, ranging from fixed to perfectly floating, thereby 
encompassing a broad spectrum of imperfect floats. Such classification efforts 
are not without problems (see AGHEVLI et alii, 1991, for further discussion) 
and have been an impediment to more rigorous empirical cross-country 
comparative analysis, in a number of cases. 
At the heart of the problem of choosing an adequate exchange rate regime are 
the relative merits of flexibility, as opposed to rigidity, in exchange rate 
management. Most developing countries, including transition economies, have 
since the early 1990s opted for less flexible exchange rate management with the 
increased use of the nominal (exchange rate) anchors in disinflation programmes. 
A fixed or firmly pegged exchange rate would, in principle, create a deflationary 
bias in monetary policy and provide credibility to policy-makers committed to 
disinflation. In the case of countries having experienced chronic lack of monetary 
discipline, and persistent high inflation and/or hyperinflation, a fixed exchange 
rate also allows for the import of stable inflation, as long as the country has 
comfortable international reserves, is sufficiently small, open and integrated to 
the world economy in terms of both trade and capital flows. (FRANKEL, 1996) 
In the case of transition economies, there is evidence that disinflation in a 
flexible exchange rate regime tends to be more contractionary and likely to fail 
than under a firmly pegged exchange rate. (SACHS, 1996) However, varying 
degrees of flexibility are recommended at different stages in the life cycle of 
disinflation and macroeconomic stabilisation programmes. 
It is also known that, when some degree of flexibility prevails, as in the case of 
a crawling peg, a major difficulty in exchange rate management is targeting the 
nominal exchange rate so as to preserve long-term international competitiveness 
and current account balance. In other words, the exchange rate regime has to 
be good enough to prevent the exchange rate from deviating from underlying 
fundamentals. However, little work has been done on real, rather than nominal, 
exchange rate targeting. A regime switch or policy reversal may be needed in 
the presence of an adverse domestic or external shock, or if the exchange rate 
hits a certain critical level, beyond which the current regime may be seen as 
unsustainable. If a regime switch is needed, credibility may be lost, which may 
have a destabilising impact on macroeconomic stability. Policy-makers are 
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therefore confronted with the task of identifying, not without great difficulty, 
an acceptable critical level of the nominal exchange rate, but also the 
appropriateness of a policy reversal. 
Previous studies in the area have formalised the exchange rate management 
problem in two basic ways: in terms of non-linear inflation-unemployment and 
credibility-flexibility trade-offs (OZKAN AND SUTHERLAND, 1995; 
EDWARDS, 1996a) and in terms of state- and time-contingent choices in an 
asset-pricing set-up. (SUTHERLAND, 1995) In empirical studies, exchange 
rate regimes tend to be formalised in a binary fashion, either fixed or flexible, 
and probit analysis is used to estimate the likelihood of regime changes. 
(COLLINS, 1996; EDWARDS, 1996b) This paper develops an exchange rate 
regime choice problem in a general asset-pricing set-up. The government is the 
main optimising agent in the model. Regime switches may occur because the 
government can exercise discretion in exchange rate management, which 
introduces a stochastic element in exchange rate management. Discretion may 
also be exercised in response to adverse shocks. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 contains the derivation of the 
theoretical model and the basic theoretical findings. Section 2 discusses the 
data and its statistical properties. In section 3 we establish the main variables 
to be used as the fundamentals governing the exchange rate determination 
process, and in section 4 we present the results of probit estimations. Finally, 
section 5 contains our concluding remarks. 
1. THE MODEL 
This section develops a model to explain exchange rate regime switches as a 
result of the government's optimising behaviour. Let e denote the exchange 
rate, defined as the domestic currency price of foreign currency. Let the country's 
exchange rate regime be characterised by a dirty peg such that exchange rate re- 
alignments are carried out in line with some deterministic rule defined as 
where t is time. Let the deterministic rule depend on a set of fundamentals, 
such as inflation and interest rate differentials in the domestic economy and 
abroad, changes in the domestic and foreign economic environments, income 
and expenditure variables, etc.1 
1 FLOOD AND CAREER (1983) propose a model in which <? = /[&(/)], where Hs a control 
variable interpreted as a composite 'fundamental' measuring the effect on the exchange rate of 
money and income variables. Exchange rate regime switches can therefore be state-contingent. 
Time-contingent regime switches can be examined if the exchange rate is re-defined as e = , 
as in SUTHERLAND (1995). 
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Also, let there be a probability A that the government will exercise discretion 
in exchange rate determination, thereby departing from the exchange rate 
deterministic rule. Departures form the deterministic rule can also be attributed 
to adverse domestic and external shocks. The government can therefore exercise 
an "escape clause" in exchange rate management and a departure from the 
deterministic rule in exchange rate determination characterises a regime switch. 
Because discretion is exercised with probability A , exchange rate determination 
is also governed by a stochastic element h(e,t)dq, where q is & standard 
Brownian motion process with zero drift and unit variance. Let, in addition, 
dq — w , if p{u) = ?idt, and 0, otherwise. 
Changes in the exchange rate are therefore defined as: 
de = f(e,t)dt + h(e,t)dq . (1) 
By equation (1), the exchange rate follows a deterministic path and has a 
stochastic component, which is a Poisson process with probability A of a regime 
switch. If the exchange rate deviates from the underlying deterministic rule, it 
becomes eD = e-\-h{e,t)u . On the other hand, if there is no deviation from 
the deterministic rule, the exchange rate is defined as eR = e + f {e,t)dt. In 
the absence of deviations from the deterministic path, the exchange rate regime 
gains credibility, which can be defined by a function C(eR ,t). Let C be an 
increasing function of e . 
Overall, changes in the exchange rate regime are based on the government's 
policy choice problem, which consists of comparing two payoffs: one, if the 
current exchange rate regime is preserved and credibility is enhanced, and 
another, if it is allowed to deviate, due to discretion in policy-making or an 
accommodation of adverse shocks. The choice of whether the current exchange 
rate regime should be preserved or not depends on the government's perceived 
relative benefits of alternative regimes. Let the payoff to the government in the 
case of a regime change be F(eD ,t) and, if the deterministic rule is preserved, 
the government's payoff is F(eR ,t\eD). The policy choice can be defined in 
function F(e,t) such that: 
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F{e,t) = max[F{eD,t),C{eR ,t) + C(E[F{eR,t\eD]], (2) 
where E is the expectations operator conditional on information available at 
time t. 
Parameter a in equation (2) is the government's rate of substitution between 
alternative exchange rate regimes. A low a means that the government is 
more indifferent between deviating from the deterministic rule (exercising 
discretion or accommodating a shock) and sticking to the current regime. 
Parameter a may also be interpreted as the political cost of regime reversals, 
which is, in this set-up, independent of the severity of the regime switch, or 
exchange rate re-alignment. The higher the political cost associated with a regime 
switch, the higher the parameter cc. An alternative interpretation of parameter 
a is the degree of temptation of the government to exercise discretion or to 
accommodate a shock, thereby promoting a policy reversal. If the political cost 
of exercising discretion is low and the government is indifferent between the 
two alternatives (low a ), then it is more tempted to allow deviations in 
exchange rate management. 
By equation (2), the government chooses the highest payoff. In the absence of 
a regime switch, credibility is enhanced by C(E[F(eR ,t\eD]. The higher the 
political cost associated with a regime switch (or, equivalently, the lower the 
rate of substitution between both policy options or the degree of temptation), 
the higher the term aE[F(eR ,t\eD], which increases the second argument on 
the right-hand side of equation (2). In particular, F(e,t) can be defined as a 
variable that measures the relative attractiveness of preserving the current 
exchange rate regime, as opposed to changing it. In other words, by equation 
(2), the government trades off the benefits of avoiding exchange rate disequilibria 
and of re-alignment, given the costs inherent in both options. 
By equation (2), preserving the current exchange rate regime is optimal if: 
where Q(eR\eD)i-s the cumulative probability distribution function of the 
exchange rate under the current regime rule, conditional on the exchange rate if 
the regime changes. 
F(eD,t) <C{eR,t) + of F{eR (3) 
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The opposite sign in equation (3) guarantees that the government's payoff is 
greatest if there is a change in the exchange rate regime. A fall in the political 
cost associated with a policy reversal, or equivalently, in the degree of temptation 
or the relative valuation of the current regime against alternative regimes 
increases the attractiveness of exercising an "escape clause" in exchange rate 
management. On the other hand, a low a. (or a fall in a ), as in countries that 
have a bad reputation in exchange rate management, increases the relative weight 
of the credibility element in the second argument on the right-hand side of 
equation (2). This explains why countries with a reputation problem may choose 
to "tie their own hands", by sticking to the current regime as a means to boost 
credibility. As a result, a regime switch can be prevented not only due to 
reputational forces at work, but also due to the cost associated with a regime 
change. The immediate policy prescriptions to avoid a regime switch are hence 
raising the political cost of policy reversals, or equivalendy, the relative valuation 
of the current regime as opposed to alternative regimes. 
The important question is whether a critical exchange rate (e *) can be defined 
to prompt the government to change the current regime. This critical rate can 
be thought of as a trigger point at which it is optimal for the government to 
switch to an alternative regime. Consider the proposition below. 
Proposition: Let there be a critical value e* of the exchange rate such that an 
exchange rate appreciation {e < e*) triggers an exchange rate regime shift. 
Proof: Subtracting F{eD ,t) from both sides of equation (3) yields: 
vP(eK,r) = C(<;s,0 + aJ Fie" - F{eD ,t)>0. (4) 
Using equation (4), and letting = F(e,t) - F{eD ,t) , equation (2) can 
be re-written as: 
increasing function of e , the second argument in equation (5) is increasing. As 
in the analysis of optimal stopping problems in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), 
Z{e,t) = mia{^^(e\t) + a\z{eRJ)dQ{es\eD]}. (5) 
Assuming that (i) 
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Z(e,t) is a contraction and its fixed-point solution, e*, defines a critical 
exchange rate such that the second argument in equation (5) is positive if 
e > e* , and negative, otherwise. Q.E.D. 
The existence of a critical trigger point in exchange rate management can be 
further explored in more flexible exchange rate regimes. In a fixed exchange 
rate regime, the decision on a policy reversal depends on whether the exchange 
rate crosses the threshold defined by ^ *. In the case of a crawling peg, the 
bands within which the exchange rate is allowed to float can be defined as 
confidence intervals around the critical trigger rate. The policy reversal decision 
is then defined in a wider interval of exchange rate, rather than just one threshold 
point, as in standard optimal stopping models. 
The same reasoning applies in the case of exchange rate targeting, where the 
government determines how large an exchange rate disequilibrium has to be 
before a regime switch is triggered. The decision consists of defining a lower 
and an upper bound for the critical exchange rate, as in Gerlach (1995) and 
Ozkan and Sutherland (1995). One such situation is illustrated by an exchange 
rate regime whereby the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency is set by 
the government irrespective of the behaviour of prices in the domestic economy. 
An increase in domestic inflation would lead to the appreciation of the domestic 
currency, unless the exchange rate regime is altered. Exchange rate misalignments 
are to be avoided, given their detrimental impact on both internal and external 
balances, in terms of domestic output and employment, in the former case, and 
the current account, in the latter. Discretion would be characterised, in this 
case, by an unexpected increase in the rate of depreciation of the domestic 
currency. A critical or trigger exchange rate can therefore be defined as the 
highest acceptable value of the domestic currency relative to the foreign currency 
to which it is pegged. Reaching such a critical value prompts a regime switch.2 
2. DATA DESCRIPTION 
As for the Brazilian experience, Figure 1 illustrates the behaviour of the exchange 
rate since 1980. During most of the 1980s, Brazil maintained a policy of real 
2 OZKAN AND SUTHERLAND (1995) analyse the choice of optimal trigger rates so that the 
government minimises interest rate-induced output volatility. 
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exchange rate targeting, whereby nominal adjustments to the exchange rate 
were made in line with inflation to preserve the real exchange rate from drastic 
swings. A major policy reversal occurred in 1983 due to the deterioration of the 
current account at the beginning of the debt crisis. A maxi-devaluation was 
implemented and the exchange rate was allowed to rise to give the country the 
competitive edge needed to generate successive trade surpluses capable of 
offsetting the deterioration of the current account. In the non-orthodox policy 
era in the post-1985 period, crawling peg slow-downs often characterised the 
aftermath of adjustment plans which were short-lived, given that the underlying 
fiscal imbalances were never satisfactorily eliminated. More recently, in the 1990s, 
a real appreciation of the domestic currency was the product of a less 
accommodating exchange rate policy, given the removal of the liquidity 
constraints of the 1980s and reinsertion of the country in international capital 
markets.3 
FIGURE 1- REAL EXCHANGE RATE - (JANUARY 1978 - JUNE 1994) 
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An important preliminary step is to identify determinants of f {e,t) , in equation 
(1). There is nevertheless considerable controversy over the choice of 
fundamentals in exchange rate determination.4 The variables to be chosen should 
3 FERREIRA (1998, 1999), ROSSI (1995) and ZINI AND CATI (1993) have tested the 
purchasing power parity (ppp) hypothesis for the case of Brazil. FERREIRA (1998, 1999) has 
confirmed the validity of the monetary model to explain the process of exchange rate determination 
in Brazil using cointegration analysis. His results, which incorporate more recent data, conflict 
with those of ROSSI (1995) and ZINI AND CATI (1993), who have rejected the ppp hypothesis. 
4 For further discussion, see EDWARDS (1989) AND YOTOPOULOS (1996). 
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embody the trade-offs envisaged by the government when solving its regime 
choice problem, and the fundamentals governing the deterministic element of 
the exchange rate. The literature on exchange rate determination (e.g., 
COLLINS, 1996; EDWARDS, 1996) suggests that the following variables could 
be used as fundamentals for the underlying process of exchange rate 
determination: consumer price inflation, capacity utilisation, real sales in 
manufacturing, nominal wages, industrial production, federal bond yields, the 
short-term interest rate, and the trade balance. All of these variables are 
considered on a monthly basis and in logarithmic form, including the exchange 
rate. The sources of the data are the Central Bank of Brazil (prices, interest 
rates and trade balance), the Brazilian Statistical Bureau - IBGE (wages, 
industrial production), and the Federation of Industries of the State of Sao Paulo - 
FIESP (sales, and capacity utilisation). 
Preliminary time series analysis of the data was carried out examining the 
integration properties of the variables under consideration. In order to determine 
the appropriate lag length of each variable, we have followed a general-to- 
specific methodology, as in Ng and Perron (1995). Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
and Phillips-Perron unit root tests were then performed and the results are 
reported in Table 1. There is evidence that all variables are 1(1), with the 
exception of the consumer price index for which there was mixed evidence as to 
the correct order of integration; while the traditional ADF test rejected the null 
of stationarity in favour of nonstationarity in the first difference, the Phillips 
and Perron test suggested stationarity in first differences. In line, however, with 
other empirical studies we have assumed that prices behave as an 1(1) process 
for Brazil (see CATI et alii, 1999). 
TABLE 1 - UNIT ROOT TESTS ON THE 1ST DIFFERENCES OF VARIABLES 
Variable Phillips-Perron Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
Consumer Price Inflation 
Capacity Utilisation 
Total Sales 
Real Exchange Rate 
Wages 
Industrial Production 
Federal Bond Yield 
Short-Term Interest Rate 
Trade Balance 
-4.43** -2.79 
-5.85** -3.80** 
-13.77** -4.04** 
-11.40** -4.30** 
-10.62** -11.81** 
-16.27** -6.69** 
-13.33** -10.94** 
-12.82** -10.89** 
-20.62** -4.044** 
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3. EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION: THE FUNDAMENTALS 
where p is a white-noise disturbance term, andX is a vector of fundamentals. 
By equation (5), the stochastic component of equation (1), h(e,t)dq , can 
therefore be estimated as a residual in the process of exchange rate determination. 
However, this procedure depends on the variables chosen as the fundamentals 
governing the deterministic element of the exchange rate. 
Since the choice of fundamentals is somewhat arbitrary, we start with the simplest 
case, which is to consider that the impact of fundamentals on the exchange rate 
is captured by a deterministic time trend. The result of the estimation is reported 
in the first column of Table 2 and suggests the existence of a negative time 
trend in the period under examination. The negative trend suggests a steady 
appreciation of the domestic currency. However, because a deterministic trend 
may not capture the dynamics of irregular or transitory and regular or permanent 
components of the exchange rate over time, we also experimented with a 
stochastic, rather than deterministic, trend. The technique consists of 
decomposing the time series into the sum of a random walk plus drift and a 
stationary component. (BEVEBJDGE AND NELSON, 1981;ENDERS, 1995) 
The time series can therefore be decomposed into a stochastic trend and an 
irregular component. The best-fitting ABJMA process used to model the 
permanent component of the exchange rate in the period 1978:1 to 1994:6 is as 
follows: 
Equation (1) can be estimated as: 
= a + bAXt + v,, (5) 
Ael = -0.003 + 0.20Aet_1 + v,, 
(-1.471) (2.795) 
R2 = 0.04 . SSR = 0.225, 2(12) = 14.73(0.142). 
(6) 
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TABLE 2 - EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION 
Dependent Variable 
Ind. Variables e
, e, 
Intercept 4.68 1.91 -0.002 
(196.75) (2.63) (-0.357) 
Time Trend 
-0.004 
(-21.09) 
SR Interest Rate 
-0.11 0.02 
(-4.60) (2.021) 
Lagged SR Int. Rate 0.02 
(2.909) 
Trade Balance 0.06 0.63 
(x lO"4) (2.774) (1.568) 
Cons. Price Inflation 
-0.38 
(-6.628) 
Lagged Inflation 
-0.82 0.32 
(-4.231) (5.481) 
Capacity Utilisation 0.30 
(2.242) 
Ind. Production 
Lagged Ind. Prod. 0.20 
(1.940) 
Total Sales 
Lagged Total Sales 0.05 
(4.063) 
Adj. R2 0.69 0.65 0.18 
D.W. 0.04 0.18 1.36 
AR1 649.94 149.64 5.247 
ARCH 106.9 65.74 1.8235 
Normality 4.7823 9.060 92.288 
Heteroscedasticity 25.366 3.247 0.162 
RESET 71.664 7.8452 0.834 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. 
The real exchange rate in Brazil (in first differences) is best described by an 
AR(1) process. The regular or permanent component of the autoregressive 
process above is decomposed by calculating w-step-ahead in-sample forecasts of 
the series for each observation in the sample, where n is set arbitrarily equal to 
20. The irregular or temporary component of the series is calculated as the 
difference between the actual observation at each time period and the fitted 
value of the successive forecasts. The latter are the stochastic portion of the 
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trend. Motivation for the decomposition of the series as above is found in the 
argument that the impact of policy action on the real exchange rate is essentially 
transitory. (CALVO et alii, 1995) In this case, short-run deviations from a trend 
may be attributed largely to government action. 
Given the unit root properties of the data, we proceed to estimate another two 
variants of equation (5). The first consists of estimating equation (5) in levels, 
and the second in first differences. In doing so, we estimate first a long-run 
relationship between the exchange rate and the fundamentals and, subsequendy, 
a short-run relationship stemming from the common trend among the 
fundamentals. Because the fundamentals are 1(1) processes, stationarity is 
reached after first differencing the series. The results of the estimations of the 
impact of the fundamentals on the exchange rate in the short and the long run 
are summarised in Table 3. In the short run, the exchange rate is affected by the 
domestic short-run interest rate and the inflation rate. In the long run, the 
exchange rate is also affected by the trade balance and by capacity utilisation. 
Our results suggest that price fundamentals have a more significant impact on 
the exchange rate in the short run. It is not until the long run that domestic 
expenditure variables play a part in exchange rate determination.5 
Because we are interested in the residuals of the equations above, three different 
measures of the deviation of the exchange rate from a deterministic path can be 
identified. The three measures of deviation are shown in Figure 2. Overall, the 
deviations from the underlying fundamentals are in general lower in the long run 
(ResLR) than deviations from a long-run deterministic trend (Restrd). This is 
particularly true in the 1980s, but not in the 1990s, whereby suggesting that 
fundamentals play a more crucial role in exchange rate determination in periods of 
severe international liquidity constraints. When these constraints are less severe, the 
government can afford more latitude in exchange rate determination and hence more 
pronounced deviations are tolerated. As expected, by Figure 2, short-run deviations 
(ResSR) are much smaller than the other two measures of long-run deviation. In 
addition to the three measures above, we also use the irregular or temporary component 
of the exchange rate, calculated as a deviation from the stochastic, rather than 
deterministic, trend.6 The deviations obtained using the decomposition technique 
described above are defined according to the data generating process and not to 
arbitrarily chosen fundamentals or deterministic processes. 
5 The latter confirms the results in CARNEIRO et alii (1997), where temporal causality tests suggest 
that the Brazilian trade balance is found to be more responsive to domestic expenditure than the 
exchange rate in the first half of the 1990s. FERREIRA (1993) also finds that changes in the 
exchange rate did not affect the trade balance in the period 1972:2/1989:1. In general, usual 
explanations for the results above rest on low price elasticities (THIRLWALL, 1988), such that 
the Marshall-Lerner condition fails, and/or relatively stable real exchange rates. The former does 
not seem to be the case in Brazil, whereas the latter is true for most of the 1980-92 period. 
6 A more rigorous analysis of stationarity of the four residuals was performed using unit root tests. 
The results are available upon request. 
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TABLE 3: PROBIT ESTIMATIONS - (dependent Variable: Y,) 
Deviation from; 
Explanatory Deterministi Stochasti Short-Run Long-Run 
Variables c T rend c T rend Fundamentals Fundamentals 
Intercept -0.60 -0.61 -0.41 -0.51 2.15 
(-4.354) (-4,370) (-4.366) (-4.288) (0.561) 
Deviation 82,43 86.29 3.93 62.81 
(8.249) (7.894) (2.822) (7.330) 
Lagged 
-82,33 14.73 -3.65 -2.363 
Deviation (-8.197) (3.284) (-2.691) (-0.523) 
Inflation 
-10.38 
(-3.487) 
Lagged Inflation 9.60 
(3.048) 
Wages 5.30 
(3.065) 
Lagged Wages 
-5.86 
(-3.421) 
Observations 197 195 195 195 196 
Log. Likelihood -53.54 -52.49 -121.12 -74.95 -111.27 
R2 0.77 0.77 0.05 0.51 0.15 
% Correct 0.95 0.95 0.68 0.85 0.74 
Predictions 
FIGURE 2 - DEVIATION FUNDAMENTALS 1978/1994:6 
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4. PROBITESTIMATIONS 
In this section, we estimate the following equation: 
+ £t, (7) 
where v is the residual of equation (5) and £ is a white-noise disturbance term. 
The latent variable () in equation (7) measures changes in the exchange rate 
regime, defined as changes in the slope of the exchange rate path over time. 
dc 
The latent variable is constructed as follows: K = 0, if — < 0, and Y= 1, 
dt 
otherwise. Accordingly, the latent variable takes value 0 in the case of an 
appreciation of the domestic currency, and 1, in the case of a depreciation. A 
change in the slope of the exchange rate path can be deemed to occur at the 
critical values of the exchange rate (^*) defined in Proposition 1. As a result, 
equation (7) estimates the likelihood of regime switches to come from deviations 
from the fundamentals governing exchange rate determination. These deviations 
can be the product of policy and/or exogenous shocks. 
Because four different models were estimated using equation (5), the estimation 
of equation (7) benefits from some flexibility in the characterisation of deviations 
from deterministic fundamentals in equation (1). In the case where the 
fundamentals are captured by a deterministic time trend, the result of the 
equation (7) is satisfactory and provides broad support for the theoretical 
argument oudined in Section 2. There is little difference between the estimations 
based on deviations form a deterministic and a stochastic trend.7 The same 
conclusion applies in the case of the deviations from the explicit fundamentals 
chosen above. Overall, in the four cases, deviations from fundamentals have a 
positive impact of the latent variable, whereby leading to a depreciation of the 
domestic currency. The depreciation may be due to adverse shocks or to changes 
in the exchange rate policy. The impact of lagged deviations is negative, 
irrespective of the measure used. The coefficient of the lagged deviation from 
long-run fundamentals is nevertheless not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. This finding confirms the intuition of no lagged responses to deviations, 
once long-run equilibrium is achieved. 
7 It is not surprising that the results are similar with deterministic and stochastic trends. This is 
because the exchange rate is best described as an AR(1) process in the period under examination. 
Should the exchange rate follow a more complex process, as in a MA(^) or combined ARMA(pg) 
process, the irregular component in the series would be subject to more complex unobservable 
dynamics. 
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To assess the robustness of the fundamentals chosen above, we estimated an 
alternative probit model as follows: 
}:=f0+f1x,+(«,, (8) 
where X is the vector of fundamentals and ft) is a white-noise disturbance term. 
By equation (8), regime switches are explained direcdy by fundamentals, and 
not indirectly, by the stochastic component in exchange rate determination, 
defined as deviations from fundamentals, as above. The result of the estimation 
is reported in the last column of Table 3. Accordingly, regime switches are 
determined by the behaviour of wages and inflation. The variables are correctly 
signed, indicating that an increase in lagged inflation leads to a depreciation of 
the domestic currency. The converse is true in the case of wage increases. As for 
the contemporaneous impact of wages and inflation, an increase in the former 
and a fall in the latter lead to an appreciation of the domestic currency. 
Most importantly, the results above lend empirical support to a broad class of 
theoretical models built upon the dynamic relationship between prices, wages 
and the exchange rate. (OZKAN AND SUTHERLAND, 1995; EDWARDS, 
1996b) In those models, it is frequendy postulated that wage changes are indexed 
to inflation and exchange rate movements or, equivalently, that the inflation 
rate depends on the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency and the rate 
of change in wages. This class of models yields a dynamic trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation, which underlies the problem of exchange rate 
determination, in general, and the choice of exchange rate regime, in particular. 
The inflation-unemployment trade-off is mirrored by a credibility-flexibility 
trade-off in intertemporal policy making, as far as the choice of the exchange 
rate regime is concerned. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Previous studies have formalised the exchange rate management problem in 
two basic ways: in terms of non-linear inflation-unemployment and credibility- 
flexibility trade-offs (OZKAN AND SUTHERLAND, 1995; EDWARDS, 
1996a) and in terms of state- and time-contingent choices in an asset-pricing 
set-up. (SUTHERLAND, 1995) In this paper, we have developed an exchange 
rate regime choice problem in a general asset-pricing set-up. The government 
has been considered the main optimising agent in the model whereby regime 
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switches may occur because the government can exercise discretion in exchange 
rate management. 
In the empirical part of the paper, we have first established the fundamentals of 
the underlying exchange rate determination process. In line with recent studies 
(COLLINS, 1996; EDWARDS, 1996a) these were defined as the short-run 
interest rate on public bonds, the trade balance, the consumer price inflation, 
capacity utilisation, industrial production and real sales. In the short run, it has 
been found that the exchange rate is affected by the domestic short-run interest 
rate and the inflation rate. In the long run, the exchange rate is also affected by 
the trade balance and by capacity utilisation. 
In a later stage, we estimated a Probit model to investigate the likelihood of 
changes in the exchange rate regime for a given change in the fundamentals 
governing exchange rate determination. The Probit estimations have shown 
that there is litde difference between the estimations based on deviations from 
a deterministric and a stochastic trend. Overall, the results suggest that price 
fundamentals have a more significant impact on the exchange rate in the short 
run. It is not until the long run that domestic expenditure variables play a part 
in exchange rate determination. Regime switches are therefore largely 
determined by the behaviour of wages and inflation; an increase in lagged 
inflation leads to a depreciation of the domestic currency while the converse is 
true for wage increases. 
Because very little work has been done on real, rather than nominal, exchange 
rate targeting, the paper also attempts to fill the analytical gap in the literature 
by looking into the experience of Brazil. Broadening the sample of countries 
would shed more light on the theoretical issue under examination and allow 
more solid conclusions on the grounds of robust empirical regularities in different 
country experiences with exchange rate targeting. 
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